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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD WAYNE GAMBRELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900559-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did this Court overlook a material fact which 
renders its holding that the county attorney was not covered by 
the blanket bond inaccurate? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant appealed his convictions of negligent 
homicide claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to 
the county attorney's alleged failure to provide a proper bond. 
This Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction because the 
Iron County Attorney was acting as de facto county attorney. 
State v. Gambrell, No. 900559-CA, slip op. at 6 (Utah Ct. App. 
June 26, 1991). Additionally, the Court held that the plain 
language of the blanket bond excluded the county attorney from 
coverage. Id. at 2 n.2 (copy in Appendix A). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
No additional facts are necessary for a resolution of 
the issue raised in this petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law requires county attorneys to obtain "bonds" 
against official delinquencies. It does not require them to 
obtain "individual" bonds. Because the Iron County Attorney is 
an employee of the insured county "who is not required by law to 
furnish an individual bond to qualify for office," the blanket 
bond obtained by Iron County covers the Iron County Attorney. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'q, 4 Utah 292, 294, 11 
P. 512 (1886), the Utah Supreme Court announced the standard for 
granting rehearing: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
In Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 
(1913), the Court elaborated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have over-
looked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked some-
thing which materially affects the result . • 
If there are some reasons, however, such 
as we have indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should be 
promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its 
form will in no case be scrutinized by this 
Court. 
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The argument portion of this brief demonstrates that the State's 
petition is properly before the Court and should be granted under 
these standards. 
ARGUMENT 
THE BLANKET BOND OBTAINED BY IRON COUNTY 
COVERS THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY UNDER THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE BOND. 
The issue raised in this petition is also before this 
Court in another case, State v. Sawyers, No. 910211-CA. Attached 
in Appendix B is a copy of Point I of the State's brief in that 
case. 
The State seeks rehearing on this issue because this 
Court overlooked the use of the phrase "Individual Bond" in the 
definition section of the blanket bond and failed to note that 
Utah law does not require an individual bond to qualify for 
office. The outcome of this case will likely affect the bonding 
of county (and possibly state) officials across the state because 
the language of the bond is standardized and many elected 
officials use the same surety as Iron County. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (Supp. 1991) requires that 
elected officials "shall execute official bonds before entering 
upon the discharge of the duties of their respective offices. . . 
It does not specify that they must obtain individual bonds. 
Bonds of county officials are security "for official delin-
quencies^' nothing more. Utah Code Ann. § 52-1-7 (1989). There 
is no reason that a blanket bond covering all county officials 
cannot provide adequate protection. 
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Paragraph b of the blanket bond, quoted by this Court 
in footnote 2 of the opinion in this case, states that an 
employee covered by insuring agreements 3 and 4 is one who is not 
required by law to obtain an "Individual Bond." Because the Iron 
County Attorney was required by Utah law only to provide a bond 
and not an individual bond, the blanket bond obtained by Iron 
County covers the county attorney. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to grant rehearing and reverse its holding that the county 
attorney was not covered by the blanket bond obtained by Iron 
County. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /C day of July, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
/ SANDRA L'XSJOGREN 
^ Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
James M. Park, attorney for appellant, 110 North Main, Cedar 
City, Utah 84720, and Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, P.O. 
Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720 this 10 day of July, 1991. 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Donald Wayne Gambrell, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS "UH26J921 
00O00 
W T Noor*n 
(For Publication] 
Case No. 900559-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 26 , 1991) 
Fifth Circuit, Cedar City Department 
The Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite 
Attorneys: James M. Park, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Scott M. Burns, Cedar City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant appeals from his conviction of three counts of 
negligent homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 
(1990). As a threshold matter he challenges the trial court's 
jurisdiction and in addition challenges the court's imposition 
of three consecutive sentences, one term for each victim killed 
in the traffic accident. We affirm. 
The basic facts are not in dispute. Gambrell was driving a 
large truck loaded with 78,000 pounds of steel down a grade when 
the braking system of the truck catastrophically failed. 
In an attempt to stop the truck, Defendant steered it 
across the opposing lane of traffic toward a hillside. As he 
crossed into the opposing lane the victims came around the bend 
in their vehicle. All three were killed in the ensuing crash. 
Inspection of the six brakes that were not destroyed in the 
accident established that none were adjusted according to 
federal or state requirements. The State's expert testified 
that at the time of the accident Defendant had no potential to 
stop. Defendant admitted that he did not know how to adjust the 
brakes and that the brakes had not been adjusted since he left 
Tennessee. 
An information was signed by the putative Iron County 
Attorney, Scott M. Burns, and Defendant was ultimately tried by 
jury. The jury convicted Defendant of three counts of negligent 
homicide and the judge sentenced him to three consecutive one 
year tferms in the Iron County Jail, one year on each count. 
Defendant appeals his convictions. First, he claims the 
Iron County Attorney who signed the information instituting 
proceedings against him had not posted a bond upon taking office 
and thus was without authority to file the information. 
Defendant argues that because of the defective information the 
court did not have jurisdiction. Second, Defendant claims the 
trial court exceeded its authority under the negligent homicide 
statute by imposing three consecutive sentences, one term for 
each victim killed. These are questions of law and thus we 
review the trial court's actions for correctness. Citv of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah), cert-
jtenie£, u .s . , i l l s. ct . 120 (1990). 
I. DE FACTO COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Initially, Defendant claims that because the Iron County 
Attorney, who signed the information initiating charges against 
him, never filed a bond as required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 
(Supp. 1990),* the county attorney was without authority to 
initiate the charges. He thus argues the trial court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the case, and his convictions must be 
vacated. 
Defendant relies on Utah Code Ann. § 52-2-1 (1989), which 
provides that an office which requires a bond becomes vacant if 
the holder does not file the requisite bond within sixty days of 
the beginning of his term. 
1. "The board of county commissioners shall prescribe by 
ordinance the amount in which the following county and precinct 
officers shall execute official bonds before entering upon the 
discharge of the duties of their respective offices, viz.: . . . 
county attorney . . ..- Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (Supp. 1990). 
2. The State responds that a blanket bond issued by Western 
Surety Company covered the Iron County Attorney and thus he did 
in fact file a bond in compliance with section 17-16-11. We 
disagree. The blanket bond referred to by the State 
900559-CA 2 
Whenever any person duly elected or 
appointed to any office of the state or 
any of its political subdivisions, fails 
to qualify for such office within sixty 
days after the date of the beginning of 
(Footnote 2 continued) 
specifically excludes any employee who is required by law to 
give a bond for honesty or the faithful performance of his 
duties. The bond offers two coverages: honesty and faithful 
performance. Each provision excludes coverage for acts by 
persons required by law to file a bond. 
a. Honesty 
"Employee" as used in Insuring Agreements 1 
and 2 means a person while in the employ of 
the Insured during the Bond Period who is 
not required by law to give a bond 
conditioned for the faithful performance of 
his duties and who is a member of the staff 
or personnel of the Insured but does not 
mean the Treasurer or Tax Collector, by 
whatever title known, of the Insured. 
b. Faithful performance 
"Employee" as used in Insuring Agreements 3 
and 4 means a person while in the employ of 
the Insured during the Bond period who is 
not required by la** to furnish an 
Individual Bond to qualify for office and 
who is a member of the staff or personnel 
of the Insured but does not mean any 
Treasurer or Tax Collector by whatever 
title known. 
The State offers a letter purportedly signed by the bond 
company's general counsel stating that the bond covers Mr. 
Burns as the county attorney. It would be improper for us to 
consider this extraneous evidence as to the intent of the 
parties. The blanket bond's clear and unambiguous language 
prevents the reading proposed by the State and supported by the 
extraneous evidence. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of state 
Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990). Breuer-Harrison, 
Inc, v, Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990). 
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the term of office for which he was 
elected or appointed, such office shall 
thereupon become vacant and shall be 
filled as provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-2-1 (1989), 
Defendant calls our attention to two early Utah cases to 
support his position that because of the operation of section 
52-2-1 the trial court lacked jurisdiction. In State v. Beddo, 
22 Utah 432, 63 P. 96 (1900), the court reversed a conviction 
based on a defective information signed by a purported district 
attorney. The office of district attorney had been created by 
a new legislative act eliminating the position of county 
attorney. The court struck down the new district attorney act 
as the sections of the code to be repealed were not set out in 
their entirety as required by the state constitution, holding 
that the district attorneys had no power to sign informations. 
Appellant further supports his theory referring to State 
ex rel. Stain v. Christensen, 84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775 (1934). 
In Christensen, three men each claimed to be the State 
Treasurer. Mr. Christensen had been elected treasurer in 1928, 
posted bond and held the office. In 1932, Mr. Stain was 
elected treasurer, but as he failed to post bond Mr. 
Christensen refused to turn the office over to him. During 
1932, the legislature passed the antecedent of section 52-2-1 
which provides that an office becomes vacant should the holder 
fail to post bond. Relying on this vacancy statute, the 
governor appointed Mr. Hoge treasurer. Mr. Christensen also 
refused to turn over the office to him. The court held that 
Mr. Hoge was the treasurer, that Mr. Stain had never held the 
office and that Mr. Christensen had properly held over until 
the matter was settled but now must give up the office to Mr. 
Hoge who had been appointed to the vacant office and had 
complied with all of the requirements for occupying it, 
including filing a bond. Some consideration was given in 
dissent to the issue of de facto officers, but the majority 
pointed out that Mr. Stain, Mis not, and has not been, in 
possession of the office of State Treasurer.M Christensen, 84 
Utah at 202, 35 P.2d at 782. 
Neither case relied on by Defendant is similar to the 
facts presented in this appeal. In Beddo, there was no office 
to hold. The statute creating the office of district attorney 
was void. In Christensen, the question was who held the office 
of state treasurer, not whether the acts of the treasurer were 
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valid. In the case before us attorney Burns assumed a 
constitutionally established office and performed its functions. 
We find this case more akin to Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 
124 (Utah 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S. Ct. 1280 
(1984).3 In that case the court upheld the actions of an 
administrative licensing authority even though one of its 
members lacked statutory qualifications. The court concluded 
that there was no jurisdictional defect because the member was 
a de facto officer. The Vance court cited Hussev v. Smith, 99 
U.S. 20 (1878), in its decision. In Hussev, the United States 
Marshal foreclosed on and sold property in the Utah Territory 
though it was later determined that he had no authority to do 
so. In upholding the sales the United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
An officer de facto is not a mere 
usurper, nor yet within the sanction of 
law, but one who, colore officii, claims 
and assumes to exercise official authority, 
is reputed to have it, and the community 
acquiesces accordingly. Judicial and 
ministerial officers may be in this 
position. The acts of such officers are 
held to be valid because the public good 
requires it. The principle wrongs no one. 
A different rule would be a source of 
serious and lasting evils. 
Hussev, 99 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
Actions of de facto officers have been upheld in the face 
of challenge in other jurisdictions under circumstances similar 
to the case before us. &££, e.g.. People v. Kemolev. 205 Cal. 
441, 271 P. 478 (1928) (special counsel for state who assumed 
and exercised duties of public officer under authorized 
appointment was an officer de facto though not taking oath of 
office); People v. Montova. 44 Colo. App. 234, 616 P.2d 156 
(1980) (even if ineligible as special prosecutors, members of 
3. The State improperly directs us to our unpublished decision 
in Elwood v. Holden, Case No. 890609-CA (Utah App. March 21, 
1990). Unpublished decisions have no precedential value and 
cannot be cited or used except for the purposes of applying the 
doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral 
estoppel. Utah Code of Judicial Administration R4-605. 
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Attorney General's office acted as de facto officers); State v. 
Jaramillo, 113 Idaho 862, 749 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1987) (if 
appointment of deputy prosecuting attorney not filed, he was at 
least a de facto deputy prosecuting attorney); Graaa v. State, 
112 Neb. 732, 201 N.W. 338 (1924) (where not qualified, person 
holding himself out as county attorney is such officer de 
facto); People v. Jackson. A.D.2d , 558 N.Y.S.2d 590 
(1990) (reversing by memorandum opinion the order of a trial 
court which vacated a conviction when the prosecuting deputy 
district attorney was not a member of any bar); In re G.V., 136 
Vt. 499, 394 A.2d 1126 (1978) (state's attorney who failed to 
file a bond is a de facto officer; her motion to terminate 
parental rights conferred jurisdiction on the lower court); 
Pamanet v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 501, 182 N.W.2d 459 (1971) (when a 
district attorney elected in one county served two counties, 
though his acts are arguably illegal as to the second county he 
was an officer de facto). 
Under the de facto doctrine the acts of one who assumes 
official authority and exercises duties under color of a valid 
appointment or election are valid where the community 
acquiesces to his authority. The mere failure to comply with a 
technical requirement does not void the official's actions as 
to third parties and the public. The acts are valid if in the 
interest of justice. Vance 671 p.2d at 131 n.5 (citing State 
v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 472 (1871)). 
Scott M. Burns was duly elected the Iron County Attorney. 
He entered into the discharge of the duties of that existing 
office, and discharged his duties for the public good. The 
community acquiesced to his exercise of the duties of the 
office. The only defect to Burns' holding the office de jure 
was his failure to file an acceptable bond. We therefore 
conclude that the filing of the information instituting 
proceedings against Defendant was the valid act of a de facto 
county attorney and conferred jurisdiction upon the court. 
II. MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS 
Next, Defendant argues that he can be convicted and 
sentenced on only one count of criminal homicide, not three, as 
all of the deaths resulted from one accident. Defendant relies 
on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1990). 
[W]hen the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish 
offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision. 
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Defendant's argument is contrary to Utah law. The Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981), 
held, "In crimes against the person (as contrasted with crimes 
against property), a single criminal act or episode may 
constitute as many offenses as there are victims." James, 631 
P.2d at 855. 
The Utah Court of Appeals followed James recently in State 
v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1989). The defendant in Mane, 
among other things, fired a single bullet that harmed two 
people. The court specifically addressed Defendant's 
contention that section 76-1-402(1) prevented his punishment 
for the injury to each victim. 
[T]he term "same act" as used in section 
76-1-402(1) should be read in conjunction 
with the latter statutory language in the 
same section, pertaining to offenses under 
different provisions of the code which may 
be violated by a single act. As implied in 
James, for example, the single act of 
shooting Brown could be chargeable as first 
degree homicide, negligent homicide or 
manslaughter. However, the shooting of a 
second victim, albeit with the same bullet, 
is not an offense "which may be punished in 
different ways under the different 
provisions of this code," but is punishable 
as a separate offense. We do not believe 
that the legislature intended to preclude 
greater punishment where multiple victims 
exist. . . • We, therefore, hold that "act" 
as used in section 76-1-402(1) includes not 
only volitional acts of a defendant, but 
also the number of victims, as each is 
acted upon by a defendant. . . . Each 
striking was an "act" constituting a 
separate offense, allowing separate charges 
and convictions. 
Man£, 783 P.2d at 64-65. 
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Utah's position is consistent with a large majority of 
jurisdictions which specifically endorse multiple convictions 
and possible consecutive punishments where there are multiple 
victims of a single criminal act. £j££, e.g., People v. Lovett. 
90 Mich. App. 169, 283 N.W.2d 357 (1979); Vioil v. State, 563 
P.2d 1344 (Wyo. 1977), These cases, and others, are collected 
in Owens, Alabama's Minority Status: A Single Conviction 
Injuring Multiple Persons Constitutes Only a Single Offense, 16 
Cumb. L. Rev. 85 (1985). 
This principle has been applied to negligent homicide 
where several persons were killed in one automobile accident. 
State v. Miranda. 3 Ariz. App. 550, 416 P.2d 444 (1966) 
(driver's single course of conduct can result in multiple 
offenses as the killing of each person constitutes a separate 
offense); Murray v. United States, 358 A.2d 314 (D.C. 1976) 
(judge had power to impose consecutive sentences for negligent 
homicide of two persons in a single automobile accident); State 
v. Whitlev, 382 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1964) (killing of three people 
in one automobile accident constituted three separate offenses 
for which three consecutive sentences could be imposed).4 
Defendant was properly charged and convicted for three 
separate counts of negligent homicide. The imposition of 
consecutive sentences on each count was within the discretion 
of the trial court. 
We affirm. 
4. Recent cases that uphold this principle include State v. 
Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986) (overturning prior decisions 
and adopting one count per victim with consecutive sentences 
for each count allowable); State v. Clark, 227 N.J. Super, 204, 
545 A.2d 1366 (App. Div. 1988) (when different victims are 
involved there are as many offenses as individuals affected); 
Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en 
banc) (death of each passenger in an automobile a complete and 
distinct offense in context of involuntary manslaughter). 
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APPENDIX B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JUSTIN CHET SAWYERS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
36 North 300 West 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0279 
Case No. 910211-CA 
Priority No. 2 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF 
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TO A 
MINOR, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (SUPP. 1990), IN.THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING. 
Attorney for Appellant 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The blanket bond obtained by Iron County complied with 
the statutory requirement that the county attorney be bonded. 
Nothing in the statute requires the county attorney or other 
county officials to obtain an individual bond. The blanket bond 
obtained by Iron County substantially complied with the law and 
was not void. 
The handwriting samples were lawfully obtained from 
defendant after notice and upon a court order. An order 
requiring samples of one's handwriting does not violate the Utah 
Constitution. 
The controlled substances act is not invalidated in its 
entirety under State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
This Court stated in Green that only the portion of the act that 
delegated legislative authority to the United States Attorney 
General was invalid. Schedule I of the act has specifically 
listed LSD as a controlled substance since at least 1971. The 
inclusion of LSD was not by virtue of the United States Attorney 
General adding it to the list. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BLANKET BOND OBTAINED BY IRON COUNTY 
SATISFIED THE STATUTORY BONDING REQUIREMENT. 
Defendant argues in Points I and III through VII of his 
brief that the prosecution in this case was invalid for various 
reasons all relating back to his claim that the blanket bond 
issued by Western Surety Company to Iron County either did not 
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cover the elected county officials or was void. All of defen-
dant's arguments fail if the bond was valid and covered these 
persons. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 17-16-11 (Supp. 1990) requires that 
elected county officials "shall execute official bonds before 
entering upon the discharge of the duties of their respective 
offices. . . . " Defendant asserts that this statute requires 
that they obtain individual bonds rather than a blanket bond. 
However, nothing in the statute precludes a blanket bond. The 
plain purpose of the statute is that government be protected in 
the event the surety should be called upon to provide coverage. 
Bonds of county officials are security "for official delin-
quencies," nothing more. Utah Code Ann. § 52-1-7 (1989). There 
is no reason that a blanket bond cannot provide adequate protec-
tion. Defendant's insistence that the bonds be individual ele-
vates form over substance and is inconsistent with this Court's 
duty to construe statutes to give effect to the legislature's 
purpose in enacting them. Crawford v. Tillev, 780 P.2d 1248, 
1251 (Utah 1989). Additionally, "[n]o bond shall be void for 
failure to comply with the law as to matters of form, but it 
shall be valid as to all matters contained therein, if it 
complies substantially with the law." Utah Code Ann. § 52-1-10 
(1989). The blanket bbnd substantially complied with the law. 
The blanket bond issued by Western Surety Company 
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defines the covered employees in two ways. The second is: 
"Employee" as used in Insuring Agreements 3 
and 4 means a person while in the employ of 
the Insured during the Bond Period who is not 
required by law to furnish an Individual Bond 
to qualify for office and who is a member of 
the staff or personnel of the Insured but 
does not mean any Treasurer or Tax Collector 
by whatever title known. 
(Exhibit D-4 at 2). Western Surety states that the bond covers 
the elected officials of Iron County under this definition 
because they are not required by law to provide an individual 
bond to qualify for office (exhibit D-10). Western Surety 
believes itself bound by the blanket bond to indemnify the 
elected officials fid.). Because the surety is bound by the 
blanket bond to cover the elected officials of Iron County and 
because the elected officials of Iron County were not required to 
provide an individual bond to qualify for office, defendant's 
arguments fail. 
Defendant further asserts that § 17-16-11 requires the 
county officials to sign the bond before it is valid. It is not 
clear where defendant derives this requirement but it may be from 
the word "execute." The meaning of the word execute is to carry 
out or perform something. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 
1976 ed. at 400. Thus, the use of the words "execute a bond" 
cannot be read to mean "sign a bond" as defendant appears to 
contend. 
Defendant also claims that the blanket bond was not 
recorded by the county recorder as required by § 17-16-11. He 
asserts that this failure results in all of the county offices 
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being vacant under Utah Code Ann. $ 52-2-1 (1989). However, 
defendant ignores that the failure to record the bond is a matter 
of form which S 52-1-10 declares insufficient to invalidate the 
bond. 
Defendant also asserts in Point II of his brief that 
the information was invalid because it was signed by Kyle Latimer 
as Deputy County Attorney. Defendant asserts that Latimer was 
not the official deputy because his oath of office was admini-
stered by an unbonded county clerk who was, therefore, not 
qualified to serve and because there was not a written appoint-
ment of Latimer on file in the clerk's office as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-16-7(3) (Supp. 1990). The oath of office issue is 
disposed by the preceding discussion of the sufficiency of the 
blanket bond. The lack of a written appointment on file in the 
clerk's office is not fatal to the prosecution of this case. 
De facto officers have been recognized by the courts of 
this state. Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 130 (Utah 1983). A 
de facto officer is a person who claims and assumes the exercise 
of official authority, who is reputed to have the authority and 
to whom the community acquiesces the authority. Ld. De facto 
officers include those who acted act under color of a known and 
valid appointment but who failed to "take an oath, give a bond, 
or the like." Id. at 131 n.5. As a policy matter, courts will 
validate the actions of de facto officers "because the public 
good requires it[, and] [t]he principle wrongs no one." Id. at 
131 (Quoting Hussev v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24 (1878)). 
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The appointment of Latimer in this case was known and 
valid• The written documentation of the appointment was simply 
not filed in the county clerk's office. Thus, public policy 
cries out for this Court to find that Latimer was acting as a de 
facto deputy and the information signed by him was valid* 
Finally, if this Court determines that the blanket bond 
did not cover the elected officials of Iron County, or was void 
for any of the reasons propounded by defendant, it should find 
that the elected officials were acting as de facto officers. As 
argued above, failure to give a bond or take an oath where there 
is a known and valid election will not invalidate the actions of 
the elected official. Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 n.5. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE 
HANDWRITING SAMPLES WAS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Defendant encourages this Court to ignore the Utah 
Supreme Court's holding in American Fork City v. Cosarove, 701 
P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), overruling Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 
315 (Utah 1980). This Court should decline the invitation 
because defendant offers only an argument that Cosarove was wrong 
in its decision to cast out the so-called "affirmative act 
standard." Even if this Court disagrees with the wisdom of the 
Supreme Court's decision, it is bound by it. 
Defendant also asserts that the order compelling him to 
provide handwriting samples violated article I, SS 7 and 12 of 
the Utah Constitution. Defendant provides this Court with no 
analysis of how the order was a denial of due process or an 
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